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Introduction
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1 sell products to consumers -hence we need to worry about e¢ciency implications if the banking sector is not competitive. However, banks are much more important than this at a macro level. Firstly, banks advance credit or loans to both …rms and consumers and thus an uncompetitive banking sector will lead to an underprovision of such credit or loans (Claessens & Laeven, 2005) . This may negatively impact the overall economic performance of the Many authors 2 have given much criticism to using structural methods when measuring competition in the banking sector. This paper therefore focuses on non-structural forms of measurement which takes into account that banks behave di¤erently depending on the market structure in which they operate (Baumol, 1982) . The non-structural models used are the Panzar and Rosse (1987) approach and the Bresnahan (1982) model. Our results 1 Indeed, Kot (2004) , in his study of the interest rate pass-through in the new EUmember states, …nds that increases in the degree of competition in the banking sector coincides with faster transmission of the monetary policy impulses to the consumer credit prices. 2 2 Literature Review
Banking Competition Theory
There have traditionally been two main methods for determining the level of competition in the banking sector, namely tests on structural and nonstructural characteristics of banks.
The structural tests focus on characteristics such as the level of concentration in the industry, the number of banks, market share, etc (Bain, 1951 ).
There are two main structural theories, the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework and the e¢ciency hypothesis (EH) (Bikker & Haaf, 2001 ).
The SCP framework says that in highly concentrated markets, banks use market power to increase pro…ts through higher loan prices and lower deposits rates -leading to a low level of competition (Bain, 1951) . This is a commonly used structural test for competition.
There are many criticisms to the SCP framework. One theoretical criticism was originally put forth by Demsetz (1973) and later by Berger (1995) .
They postulate that, contrary to the SCP approach, the larger market shares which lead to a high level of concentration, are a result of better e¢ciency and lower costs rather than a low level of competition. Other arguments against the use of concentration as a measure of the level of competition includes the theory introduced by Mullineux & Sinclair (2000) . They argue that although higher concentration may lead to higher prices, and as a result lower demand, it does not necessarily result in higher pro…ts for a highly concentrated banking sector. Indeed, the modern (New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO)) view is that both industry structure and industry performance are endogenous -being driven by some other factors.
As Schmalensee (1989) puts it, "...except in textbook competitive markets, derived market structure is clearly a¤ected by market conduct in the long run" (p. 954). The NEIO thus does not assume a causal relationship between market structure and performance, but rather, the approach tests competition and the use of market power (Bikker & Haaf, 2002: 21; Bresnahan, 1989 ).
The most commonly used non-structural models in banking sector studies are the Panzar and Rosse approach (Rosse & Panzar, 1977; Panzar & Rosse, 1987 ) and the Bresnahan model 3 (Bresnahan, 1982) . 4 These models recognise that banks behave di¤erently depending on the market structures in which they operate (Baumol, 1982) . They also do not ignore the relationship between market contestability and revenue behaviour at the …rm level, which the structural methods do (Perera et al., 2006).
Overview of the South African Banking Sector
In the recent Banking Enquiry carried out by the Enquiry Panel of the Competition Commission (Jali et al., 2008) , it was concluded that the South African banks were not acting as a cartel. 5 Despite this, the panel also believes that the cost and trouble involved for customers to switch banks weakens the competitive e¤ect of price di¤erences between banks. They stated that this "allows supra-competitive pricing to be maintained." (Jali 3 Added to by Lau (1982) . 4 The third model, the Iwata model (Iwata, 1974) , is less utilised due to its rigid data requirements (Perera et al., 2006 ). The Bresnahan model is an improved version of the Iwata model and has been used in numerous studies. 5 This conclusion is arrived at based on qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) analyses of the banking sector. The table illustrates that banks in South Africa play an important role as major lenders, especially to the private sector. They also receive a huge amount of deposits. They therefore play an important role towards the facilitation of the credit process.
In the banking sector, the measure of market share can be approximately calculated by the bank's total assets (a proxy for total loans) or total deposits as a percentage of industry totals. It can be seen in Tables 2 and 3 below that the total deposits and total assets in 2007 are dominated by the four main banks, Standard Bank, Firstrand, Nedbank and ABSA. These four banks have market share in excess of 90%. This high market share should potentially allow them to partake in collusive practices, raising their lending 6 A case where increased market transparency was harmful to competition is the famous case in Danish Cement industry whereby the competition authority decided to intervene to enhance the competition by requiring a daily price list (for two grades of ready-mixed concrete) to be revealed but this had an adverse e¤ect on the competition and rather encouraged collusion. The requirement to publish a price list resulted in substantially reduced price dispersion and average prices of reported grades increased by 15 -20 percent within one year (Albaek, Mollegard and Overgaard, 2003).
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rates and lowering their deposit rates. Table 2 about here   Table 3 An increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, causing equilibrium output to decrease and equilibrium price to increase. Given that their elasticity of demand is greater than unity, the increase in prices will result in a reduction in the total revenue of the bank. This reduction in revenue reveals that banks are acting in an anticompetitive manner.
Prior South African Banking Competition Research
In a perfectly competitive environment however, an increase in input prices leads to a rise in both marginal and average costs, with no change in the optimal output for the individual banks. 9 Theoretically, some banks should exit the market, allowing the demand faced by the remaining banks to increase. This should result in a proportionate increase in prices and revenues. The percentage increase in revenues should be exactly equal to the percentage increase in marginal costs in the case of a perfectly competitive market (Bikker & Haaf, 2002) . However, as shown by Bikker et al (2012) , if …rms face constant average costs, it is possible that revenues will decrease following an increase in input prices -negatively impacting the discriminating power of the P-R methodology. Should the industry environment be that of monopolistic competition, the revenue will still increase by the same mechanism as in perfect competition, but by not as much as the marginal cost. The more competitive the market, the more the revenues will increase as a result of an increase in input prices. 10 By maximising pro…ts at both the individual bank and industry level, the equilibrium output and equilibrium number of banks can be found. At the bank level, marginal revenues must equal marginal costs in order to maximise each bank's individual pro…ts, therefore
where R 0 i and C 0 i are the marginal revenue and marginal cost of bank i respectively. The marginal revenue of bank i is a function of their output (x i ) and a vector of variables that shift their revenue function exogenously (z i ), as well as the number of banks (n). The marginal cost of bank i is a function of their output, a vector of m factor input prices faced by the bank 9 This hinges on the assumptions of linear homogeneity of the cost function and long run equilibrium.
1 0 This however must be quali…ed as the cost structure may disallow full pass-through of input prices to revenues even for …rms in long-run competitive equilibrium, as shown by Bikker et al. (2012) . Thus the extent of pass-through is not necessarily that informative regarding the nature of competition.
8
(w i ), and a vector of variables that shift their cost function exogenously (t i ).
Furthermore, in order to determine the optimal number of banks, 11 the zero pro…t constraint must also hold at the industry level. Therefore R i (x ; n ; z) C i (x ; w; t) = 0;
where the superscript * denotes equilibrium values.
Panzar and Rosse have de…ned an H -statistic as the sum of the elasticity of the banks' revenue with respect to a change in each of m factor input prices. The H -statistic is therefore
where R i is the equilibrium revenue for bank i and w k i is the input price of factor k for bank i. side of long run competitive equilibrium, the value of H carries an ambiguous interpretation. 13 While Panzar and Rosse (1987) show that H is a decreas-1 1 If this condition does not hold at the industry level, banks will realise potential pro…ts (losses) and enter (leave) the market until the equilibrium number of banks is obtained. This zero pro…t constraint holds at this equilibrium. 1 2 Ibid. 1 3 Bikker et al. (2012) show in their Proposition 3.6 that H < 1 or even H < 0 is possible for …rms in long-run competitive equilibrium with constant average costs (p. 13).
ing function of the Lerner index for a pure monopoly, Sha¤er (1983) show that H is an increasing function of market power for an oligopolist facing …xed demand. Thus, outside of the long run competitive equilibrium where …rms face U-shaped average costs, the sign of H is more informative than the value of H:
The Empirical Model
The theoretical model described above has been interpreted by many authors in di¤erent ways. This paper will follow the methodology of Bikker et al (2012) . The reduced form revenue equation is
where INTR is total interest revenue; AFR is the ratio of annual interest expenses to total balance sheet; PPE is the ratio of personnel/sta¤ expenses to total balance sheet; PCE is the ratio of physical capital expenditure and other expenses to …xed assets; BSF are Bank Speci…c Factors (loans to total assets and equity to total assets); OI is the ratio of other income to the total balance sheet; and e is the stochastic error term. 14 Given this structure of the reduced form revenue equation, the H -statistic can be represented as + + .
Data
All of the data are available from individual banks' annual reports and …- The BSF variable includes bank speci…c exogenous factors. These bank speci…c factors are other explanatory variables that re ‡ect di¤erences in risks, costs, size and structure of banks (Bikker & Haaf, 2002) . In this study we use two bank speci…c ratios: Equity to Total Assets (BSF-EQ) and Loans to Total Assets (BSF-LO). 15 The inclusion of the non-performing loans ratio reduces the sample size to half. It was decided that the bene…t of this gain in a control variable does not outweigh the loss of power of the model. This variable was therefore excluded from the regression.
Empirical Results
We estimate the unscaled revenue equation as proposed by Bikker et al.
(2012) using the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) method. Total interest income is regressed on bank input prices (price of deposits (AFR), wage rate (PPE), and price of capital (PCE)), and control variables (credit risk (BSF-LO), leverage (BSF-EQ), and other income (OI)). We …rst estimate the unscaled revenue equation as given in (1) above. The results are reported in Table 4a . The coe¢cient on the average funding rate is negative (-0.134) but insigni…cant, the wage rate is positive (0.50) and signi…cant at the 5% level; the price of physical capital is also positive (0.32) and signi…-cant at the 5% level. All the control variables are signi…cant and the signs are consistent with the theory. In particular, BSF-LO is positive, suggesting that a higher loans to total assets ratio raises interest income, BSF-EQ carries a negative sign, indicating that lower leverage reduces interest income, and OI has a negative impact on interest income as expected. The associated P-R statistic -which is given by the summation of the input elasticities -is given by H = 0:69. A concern raised in Bikker et al (2012) is that even though the estimated equation is an unscaled equation, there are implicit scale e¤ects as some of the right hand variables such as BSF-LO and BSF-EQ have total assets as a denominator. To address this concern, we check for correlations between these 'implicitly' scaled variables and total assets. We then regress interest income on the explanatory variables, but correcting all explanatory variables for scale (i.e., replacing the explanatory variables with residuals (Bikker et al (2012; p. 24))). 16 This constitutes our preferred model. We report the results in Table 4b. 17   Table 4b about here.
Again, we …nd that AFR is insigni…cant, while PPE is signi…cant at the 5 percent level and carries a positive sign as expected, PCE is signi…cant at the 10 percent level, but carries a negative sign suggesting that an increase in capital expenses lowers interest income for banks in South Africa. Both BSF-LO and BSF-EQ are insigni…cant at the 10 percent level while OI is signi…cant at the one percent level and carries a negative sign as expected from theory -indicating that as banks increase their share of non-interest earning assets, interest income decreases. Summing the input price elasticities yields an H statistic of 0:53, which is lower than in the uncorrected regression -suggesting the upward bias e¤ect of the "implicit" scale factors.
We test the following three null hypotheses: (i) H 0 : AF R + P P E + P CE 0; (ii) H 0 : 0 < AF R + P P E + P CE < 1; and (iii) H 0 :
AF R + P P E + P CE = 1 to determine the nature of competition in the South African banking sector. These three hypotheses test for monopoly/oligopoly/cartel or short run competitive equilibrium; monopolistic competition; and longrun competitive equilibrium /contestable monopolies or sales maximisation subject to break-even constraint respectively (Bikker et al (2012)). The null hypothesis H 0 : AF R + P P E + P CE 0 is rejected at the 5 percent level, with a positive t-value of 2.38 (one tailed test). Monopoly/oligopoly/cartel or short run competitive equilibrium is thus rejected for the South African baking sector. The null hypothesis H 0 : AF R + P P E + P CE = 1 is also rejected at the 5% level (p = 0:019), implying that the H -statistic is statistically di¤erent from one (more precisely, smaller than unit, as it is a one-tailed test). However, without information on the cost structure of the banking sector, there is not su¢cient information for us to conclude that long run competitive equilibrium is rejected. We also tested for the null hypothesis of monopolistic competition, H 0 : 0 < AF R + P P E + P CE < 1;
and we cannot reject this null hypothesis. We thus conclude that the South 1 7 We also conducted a ROA test to test whether or not the observations are in long run equilibrium. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of long-run equilibrium. 18 That personnel costs signi…cantly explain interest income is interesting.
There are debates currently in South Africa around …nancialisation of the economy. Concerns are that the …nancial sector is growing too fast, and at the expense of other sectors, as it has been able to attract skills from other sectors through its ability to pay higher wages. The high degree of concentration and the and the high switching costs and complex bank products help explain the monopolistic outcome (Jali et al (2008)). Indeed, despite the high concentration, non-price competition appears to be signi…cant, for example, advertising.
The Bresnahan Model

Methodology
The Theoretical Model
The second model that is used to measure competition in the South African banking sector is the Bresnahan Model (Bresnahan (1982) ). This is a nonstructural test for the degree of competitiveness, such that this model can be used even when there is no cost or pro…t data available. This can be done by using industry aggregate data to measure this competition.
The idea behind this model is to see how price and quantity react to changes in exogenous variables -revealing the degree of market power of the average bank, and hence the level of competition in the banking industry.
The pro…t function for the average bank takes the form of
where i is pro…t; x i is the quantity of output of the bank; p is the output price; c i are the variable costs; and F i are the …xed costs faced by bank i.
The variable costs are a function of the output of the bank, as well as the exogenous variables that a¤ect marginal costs, but not the industry demand function (EX S ).
The inverse of the demand function faced by the banks is
such that prices are a function of exogenous variables that a¤ect the industry demand but not the marginal cost (EX D ) and each of the n banks' outputs.
The …rst order conditions for pro…t maximization of bank i is
Summing over all banks gives
where is the measure of the level of competition in the banking sector and is equal to
In this case, is a "function of the conjectural variation 19 of the average …rm 
The Empirical Model
As is standard in the literature, we consider deposits as an input rather than an output of the bank. We consider the banks output to be loans, and the demand for loans is given by,
where Q is the real value of total assets (a proxy for loans) in the industry (used to measure banking services or output); P is the price of the banking services; EX D are the exogenous variables that a¤ect industry demand for banking services, but not the marginal costs -including disposable income, number of bank branches and interest rates for alternative investments (the money market rate and the government bond rate); and is the error term.
The interaction terms EX D P are included to ensure the identi…ability of the conduct parameter, : Without the interaction terms, one cannot distinguish competition from monopoly (Bresnahan 1982: 152-153 ).
On the supply side, Bikker and Haaf as well as Sha¤er (1993) postulate the following marginal cost function: 20
where M C is the marginal cost for each bank; EX S are the exogenous variables that in ‡uence the supply of loans, including the cost of input factors for the production of loans -wages, deposit rate and price of physical capital. The cost function as speci…ed, is a legitimate marginal cost function as it satis…es all the requisite properties.
Rearranging the demand function yields,
The total revenue for each bank can be obtained by multiplying the above rearranged demand equation by bank i's output, Q,
Di¤erentiating this total revenue with respect to bank i's output will give the bank's marginal revenue,
Equating the marginal revenue and marginal cost of each bank to obtain the market equilibrium,
Rearranging and averaging to obtain the supply of loan facilities by the banks yields:
Equations (3) and (9) constitute a system of two equations which we need to estimate to determine the statistic. 21 We thus have a simultaneous equation system and because of the possible endogeneity problem, equations (3) and (9) are estimated simultaneously to identify :
The Statistic
This coe¢cient is the value that determines the level of competition in the banking sector. Speci…cally, indexes the degree of market power of the average bank (Sha¤er, 2001 ). If = 0; the outcome is competitive while = 1 if the outcome is perfectly collusive. For 2 (0; 1) ; the banking market is imperfectly competitive, and allows for all forms of oligopoly behaviour (see Sha¤er (2001) for further explanations).
The estimated equations are: Q = a 0 + a 1 P + a 2 gdp + a 3 P gdp + a 4 govt_r + a 5 P govt_r + ; (10) P = Q a 1 + a 3 gdp + a 5 govt_r +b 0 +b 1 ln Q+b 2 ln wage+b 4 ln r +b 5 ln pce+v;
where Q is the quantity of banking services measured as the dollar value of total assets and P is the pricing of banking services measured by the interest rate earned on the assets; gdp is the real gross domestic product, govt_r is the 3 month government treasury bill rate, P govt_r and P gdp are interaction terms; wage is the average real wage in banking sector and r is the deposit rate and pce is the price of physical capital. The variable, 
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The speci…cation of the parameter implicitly assumes that banks are input-price takers -which is plausible for labour and physical capital since in South Africa banks compete with other …rms for labour and capital. For deposits however, the case may be di¤erent. It is possible that the deposit rate may be exogenous, if there is sti¤ competition for deposits (Sha¤er, 1993 (Sha¤er, , 2004 . In that case the above assumptions still hold and banks would still be input price-takers even when it comes to deposits. However if banks have market power in deposits then the as speci…ed in the model may overstate the degree of market power and thus be biased against the competitive case (Sha¤er, 1993).
Data
The data required for the Bresnahan model are all macroeconomic (industry level) time series variables. Macroeconomic data is generally easier to obtain than microeconomic data. This is one of the bene…ts of using the Bresnahan model versus models that use bank speci…c data such as the Panzar and 22 There was insu¢cient time series data on the number of bank branches, therefore this variable was excluded from this study.
Empirical Results
The quantity of banking services is determined by the price of banking services and exogenous variables such as GDP and government treasury bill rate. The price coe¢cient should be consistent with a downward-sloping demand curve. The government debt rate, being a price of a substitute, should have a negative coe¢cient. GDP proxies for income and it is expected to be positive.
The supply equation (9) We estimate equations (10) and (11) and the outputs are reported in the Table 5 below. 23 Given that P (an endogenous variable in the supply equation) appears as a regressor in the demand equation (10) are only marginally met. The joint test of a 3 = a 5 = 0 cannot be rejected at the 10% level. However, individual tests show that a 3 = 0 is rejected at the 10% level (but not at the 5% level) while a 5 = 0 cannot be rejected at the 10% level. Given these weak identi…cation results and our intuition on the equilibrium relationship between demand and supply, we proceeded to estimate the demand and supply equations simultaneously using a SAS programme. Table 5 about here.
For the demand equation, GDP is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level while the government rate (Govt_r) is only signi…cant at the 10% level, but carries the correct (negative) sign. Price carries the correct (negative) sign but is insigni…cant. The coe¢cients on the interaction terms P Govt_r and P GDP , are insigni…cant at the 10% level.
In the supply equation, the input price coe¢cients carry the expected (positive) signs -suggesting that higher prices of inputs raises the price of loans. However, only two coe¢cients are signi…cant: wages are signi…cant at the 10% level while price of capital is signi…cant at the 1% level.
The parameter of interest in this exercise is the coe¢cient of the conduct variable, . The estimation yields equal to 0.2, with a t-statistic of -0.08. The statistic is thus insigni…cant -implying that the coe¢cient is statistically equal to zero. 24 This insigni…cant coe¢cient means that 0;
and that according to the Bresnahan model, perfect competition cannot be rejected in the South African banking sector. This however does not imply competitive conduct by the South African banks as failure to reject perfect competition does not mean acceptance of competition or evidence of no market power. 25 The results of the Bresnahan model should be interpreted with caution for a number of reasons. Among these are that the data are generally imprecise and fraught with measurement errors and our sample is too short. In addition, the Bresnahan methodology appears to have weak discriminating power in practice.
Comparison with other Developing Countries
Many studies have been conducted using di¤erent methods to …nd the level of competition in the banking sectors of numerous countries across the world.
The two main approaches used are the two methods applied in this paper, the Panzar and Rosse approach and the Bresnahan model. 26 Perera et al. 
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